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POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ACCOUNTNG IN INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL 
REPORTING 
 
Abstract 
 
Several factors shaping intellectual capital reporting (ICR) in the context of the political 
economy of accounting (PEA) theory were discussed in relation to traditional accounting 
reporting system, intellectual capital and intellectual reporting definitions, techniques 
employed to report intellectual capital (IC), and theoretical classification of IC. Reporting 
intellectual capital enables firms to report them in a fashion that best suits the relationship 
between the firm and their political, economic, and social arrangement. The unregulated 
reporting can increase manipulation of ICR in a borderless reporting environment to reduce 
the tension between the firm and its political, social, and economic arrangement. 
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POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ACCOUNTNG IN INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL 
REPORTING 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The contemporary accounting can be described as a regulated institutional process and a 
constructed model to report and communicate the impact of economic activity (due to 
temporal and spatial displacements) and associated regimes of accumulation. It is an external 
reporting mechanism for profit oriented firms (Boczko, 1997, p. 13). The regulated process 
secures capitalist reproduction through institutional collection (such as laws and agreements), 
and norms and cultural habits. These institutional collections supports a capital accumulation 
regime by laws, state policy, political practice, rules of negotiation and bargaining, culture of 
consumption, and social expectations (Amin, 1994, p. 8). Tinker (1985, p. 84) argues that 
accounting is a belief-making informational commodity that measures and appraises the 
terms of exchange between different social constituencies, helps to allocate resources, and 
simultaneously determines a distribution of income. Accounting has become part of that 
exchange process by helping firms make decisions in relation to economic exchange. If the 
accounting practice did not take part in this way, competitive pressures would eradicate it as 
an unnecessary cost of production.  
 
Tinker (1985, pp. 14-15) argues that share price do not reflect historical asset values but 
rather the earnings that those assets are expected to generate.  Therefore, it is to the advantage 
of the mangers to convince capital providers of that the management is capable of using those 
assets at the highest levels of efficiency through news releases which includes accounting 
reports such as company annual reports. In this context intellectual capital reporting (ICR) 
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presents two unique situations. First, unlike social and environment reporting, ICR is 
presently unregulated offering firms to make the choice of what to report, when to report and 
where to report. Second, ICR is proactive reporting since there is no need to meet any 
legislative or accounting requirements which enable firms to fictionalize ICR to maximise the 
market value of their firms to attract and retain capital providers. 
 
This paper outlines the factors shaping ICR in the context of the political economy of 
accounting (PEA) theory. Section two of this paper reviews political economy and PEA and 
offer reasons why PEA is more applicable to ICR. The remaining sections outline the 
different variables and their impact on PEA: the role of traditional accounting; intellectual 
capital (IC) and ICR definitions; techniques for ICR; and, IC theoretical classification. The 
last section offers concluding remarks. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Firms are a focal point of economic, social, and political interactions in most market driven 
economies. They are places where the results of conflicts from the interactions leave their 
obvious marks (Grant, 1985 pp. 3-5). Therefore, it is necessary to comprehend the 
relationships between economic, social, and political forces to understand the changing 
characteristics of firms such as ICR in an unregulated reporting environment, and thereby the 
influence they have on the lives of different people.  
 
The corporatism represents an attempt to understand such reciprocal relationships that have 
developed between the state and major organised interest groups. It is the process of 
negotiating policy between state agencies and interest firms that has arisen due to division of 
labour in the society. The policy agreements are implemented by collaborating with interest 
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firms (Grant, 1985: pp3-5). These interest firms should be willing and have the ability to 
secure the compliance of their members to deliver support of their benefiting constituency 
(Chubb, 1983:26). On that basis, the interest groups can be assumed to be big listed firms or 
the big listed industry groups. These arrangements are lead by both groups, which are state 
and interest firms, in seeking each other out (Schmitter, 1979:27). This is because corporatist 
arrangements are an unintended outcome of different conflicts and policy crises where neither 
state nor the interest groups were capable of imposing their preferred solution upon the others 
(Grant, 1985: 7).  
 
The incapability to impose preferred solutions upon others arises because of four reasons. 
First, interest groups cannot attain the status of monopoly constituents, or form 
comprehensive hierarchies of sectors without some degree of official recognition or 
encouragement. Second, public officials should tacitly agree or actively promote interest 
groups to become regular, integral participants in making policies, or acquire direct 
responsibilities for policy implementation. Third, affected groups (interest groups or the 
government) may refuse to organise appropriately, or refuse to participate if they find the 
collaborating cost is too high. Fourth, relatively autonomous groups within the government 
form these arrangements. The government officials are much less enthusiastic to share the 
power of decision making with interest groups, but on the other hand, are not fully in control 
of the leadership selection of the interest group to bring about desired adjustments (Schmitter, 
1985, pp. 35, 39).    
 
For example, past research cites that unequal opportunity of employment (e.g. disabled, 
gender, and race) is a result of their poor social or political power to realise their economic 
wants as an interest group due to commodification of labour. This is because in a deregulated 
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economic approach, productive capital is privately owned and they hold the right to decide to 
make capital available for the preferred type of labour (Russell, 2002).  Another research 
found that firms influence the nature of training and wage structure, and in a in a competitive 
labour market firms have little incentive to invest in general skills of employees since they 
can take those skills to other firms (Acemoglu & Pischke, 1999). 
 
However, past case studies indicate several ways to enhance the capability of imposing a 
preferred solution by an interest group. First, is to express all demands through only a few 
voices for negotiation and compromise. Second, is to centralise the internal structure of the 
interest group to increase consensus formation and member compliance. Third, is to 
modernise the interest group to increase its professionalism. Fourth, is to create ‘modern’ 
interest groups to play their role in corporatist co-operation (Marin, 1985,:pp. 97-100). Fifth, 
to have less distinction between private and public corporatists or forge partnerships between 
private and public interest groups in delivery of products and services (King, 1985, p.  205). 
 
Most of the discussion on corporatism is based on tripartite bargaining between capital 
(economic), labour (social), and government (political) at a national level. However, 
understanding the corporatist phenomena at below the national level enhances comprehension 
of how corporatism can flourish in particular sectors or locations even when it is not apparent 
at the national level of a nation. The cumulative impact of such arrangements on the society 
could be as important as weakly enforced tripartite arrangements of a nation (Grant, 1985, p. 
4). 
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When attempting to enhance a socially optimum level or type of reporting of IC, it should 
examine the corporatist phenomena both at corporate sector level and at national level while 
enhancing the preferred by an interest group such as the state.  
 
The central importance of political economy theory is to promote the process of adjustment 
through the political capacity of the government (political), and is often pursued by working 
together with their economic (capital) and social (labour) representatives (constituents) 
(Zysman, 1983, p. 15).  
 
The PEA theory views that accounting is a means of sustaining and legitimising the current 
social, economic, and political arrangements. Accounting information is used to support those 
groups who are currently powerful in the society (Cooper, 1980; Cooper & Sherer, 1984). 
Accounting reports are a means to construct, sustain, and legitimise the economic and 
political arrangements in the private interests of the firm (Guthrie & Parker, 1990). It takes 
the view that there are two opposing forces or principles that create tension in relations with 
the constituents in the arrangement (Buhr, 1998). Firms proactively provide information from 
their perspective to set and shape the agenda of debate, and to mediate, suppress, mystify and 
transform the conflict (Guthrie & Parker, 1990). 
 
Based on the above characteristics, the PEA theory is relevant to ICR for the following seven 
reasons. First, adopting the PEA theory perspective to ICR can widen the researcher’s focus 
of analysis, by explicitly attempting to introduce wider, systematic factors into the 
interpretation and explanation of ICR phenomena (Gray, Owens, & Adams, 1996, p. 47). 
These factors make the political, social and economic arrangement in which a business 
operates more important for its stability and continuity.  Second, ICR is about proactive 
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reporting. They are not reported to meet any regulatory requirements. The PEA theory 
focuses on proactive corporate disclosure provided from the management’s perspective. It is 
designed to set and shape the agenda according to its own self-interest (Burchell, Club, 
Hopwood, Hughes & Nahapiet, 1980; Cooper, 1980; Cooper & Sherer, 1984; Tinker, 1980; 
Tinker & Neimark, 1987; Woodward, Edwards & Birkin, 2001).  Third, the political 
economy perspective perceives accounting reports are social, political, and economic 
documents. They are been used as tools to construct, sustain, and legitimise economic and 
political arrangements, institutions, and ideological themes, which contribute to the firm’s 
private interests (Guthrie & Parker, 1990). Firms use annual reports as a tool to ease tension 
in social relations between the firm and the society, and stay away from any regulation. It can 
possibly use different reporting units to varying degrees and can use different reporting 
locations within the annual report for such purposes.  This is because political economy 
perspective critically focuses on themes, meanings, and motivations implicit in voluntary 
disclosures. Annual reports may not reflect the true position of the firm as empirical findings 
indicate that there was no systematic relationship between the quantity of disclosure in annual 
reports and IC performance (Williams, 2001). This is because most listed firms use the 
annual report as a promotional or marketing document rather than merely to comply with 
accounting standards and the law (Abeysekera, 2002a). Fourth, the political economy 
approach takes the view that there are two opposing forces or principles that create tension in 
social relations (Buhr, 1998). In the area of corporate reporting, such tension can manifest 
due to the size of the firm, industry sector, ownership structure (such as diversity of share 
ownership or/and number of shareholders), ownership type (such as foreign or local), and 
difference between the market value and the net book value of the firm. Firms in return can 
use more disclosure in IC to ease such tensions.  Fifth, specific previous researches on ICR 
(Brennan, 2001; Guthrie & Petty, 2000) have shown that the frequency of IC reported 
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voluntarily by large firms varies in annual reports. These specific studies also demonstrated 
that IC items reported in annual reports could differ from country to country  (Brennan, 2001; 
Guthrie & Petty, 2000; Olsson, 2001). The differences in reporting can be due to firms 
reporting to create harmony in social relations between the firm and its social, political, and 
economic framework. Sixth, the knowledge economy facilitates propagation of thoughts, 
value, and power, by ultimately packaging and selling them in language. Past research on 
both IC and corporate social reporting confirmed that firms have used various reporting units 
both qualitative (i.e. charts, tables, photographs and narrative) and quantitative (i.e. non-fiscal 
and fiscal) in varying combination. However, several authors have pointed out that narrative 
is the predominant mode used in reporting of corporate social reporting and IC reporting 
(Andrew et al., 1989; Collier, 2001; Brennan, 2001).  The choice of reporting units can 
determine to what extent the relations are maintained with their relevant constituents because 
narrative is a powerful way to make sense.  Seventh, the reporting location within the annual 
report can have an impact on social relations between the firm and its social, political, and 
economic arrangement (Choon, Smith & Taylor, 2000; Hughes, Anderson & Golden, 2001). 
Although why a particular reporting location is preferred has not been completely resolved by 
a theory in the past, PEA theory can provide helpful guidance. 
 
3. ICR IN THE CONTEXT OF PEA 
Several factors contribute to shaping ICR in a PEA context as outlined in Figure 1 and 
discussed in the following sections. 
 
Role of traditional accounting 
The empirical studies cite several limitations imposed by the traditional accounting system in 
ICR. First, is the writing off of intellectual assets as expenses (Backhuijs, Holterman, 
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Oudman, Overgoor & Zilstra, 1999; Lev, Sarath, & Sougiannis, 1999). Authors have 
demonstrated that it leads to systematic under-valuation and relatively adverse liquidity of 
firms (Boone & Raman, 2001a; Boone & Raman, 2001b; Ronen, 2001). Dunk and Kilgore 
(2001) in a questionnaire response combined with telephone interviews of finance directors in 
Australia indicated that firms are likely to cut R&D expenditure to focus on short-term 
financial performance when the emphasis in the marketplace is on cost more than on product 
innovation. The literature suggests two ways to overcome the deficiency: (i) Hoegh-Krohn 
and Knivsfla (2000) suggest that to overcome the anomaly within the traditional accounting 
system is to reverse the previously written off intangibles once they meet the recognition 
criteria of an asset; (ii) Thompson (1998) suggests firms can add a supplementary set of 
reporting elements to acknowledge forms of capital and claims to capital that cannot be 
measured in financial terms. Others agree that it is more useful to measure them even if they 
are less exact with new rules of measurement (Heckmian & Jones, 1967).  
 
Several authors hold the view that using accounting figures without IC (like knowledge) in 
financial statements is a concern when seeking solutions to management problems (Dearden, 
1960; Anthony, 1965 ; Moorhow, 1990; Buhner, 1997; Davies & Waddington, 1999; Petty & 
Guthrie, 1999; Rohwer, 1999; Copeland, 2000; Allen, 2001). This has resulted in the current 
reporting system not presenting objective reality (Wharton Alumni Magazine, 1997) and it 
has not been a meaningful indicator of economic efficiency of a firm (Hansson, 1997; 
Graham & King, 2000; Zambon & Zan, 2000). This view is supported by others who argue 
that the present balance sheet records what has been spent and is silent on value addition to 
the firm (Swinson, 1998 pp. 4-5; Horney, 1999) and measures only the realisation of value 
rather than the creation of value of a firm (Romer, 1998; Brennan, 2001).  
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Second, accounting standards in most countries permit only recognition of purchase goodwill 
to be reported in their financial statements, which represents only a portion of IC (van der 
Meer-Kooistra & Zijlstra, 2001).  On the extreme end are Austria and Germany that do not 
recognise any intangible assets (Bornemann, Knapp, Schneider & Sixl, 1999). Japan recently 
amended their accounting regulation to record purchase goodwill in the consolidated 
accounts only (Okano, Okada & Mori, 1999). According to Unwin (1990) the outcome 
available for several countries is to amortise purchased goodwill. The literature also suggests 
that the lack of national homogeneity in accounting standards on intangibles may have given 
rise to a lack of international homogeneity on accounting standards on intangibles (Stolowy 
& Jenny-Cazavan, 2001). The International Accounting Standards (IAS) 38 which 
specifically prohibit recognition of startup costs, training costs, and advertising costs, could 
be cited as an example. They also prohibit recognising internally generated goodwill (IAS38 
1998, pp. 983-1031) and have failed to respond well to current market needs of reporting IC 
(Ravlic, 2000).  
 
[Figure 1 should appear somewhere here]. 
 
Third, some suggest that accounting theorists compound the weaknesses in traditional 
accounting by presenting theories that have little relationship to actual economic conditions 
(Merino, 1993). They have adopted a less pragmatic perspective by viewing it as a purely 
technical discipline, and have failed to analyse the role accounting plays in the society. 
Chapman (1997) states that the failure to respond to the contingent nature of accounting lead 
to the loss of credibility in the accounting profession (Chapman, 1997).  Further, the 
coexistence of several accounting approaches also has made it complex to verify the multi-
dimensional character of ICR in a firm (Zambon & Zan, 2000).  
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The above-mentioned weaknesses of traditional accounting are believed to be responsible for 
the gap between the market value and the net book value of the firm. The gap has highlighted 
and questioned the relevance of accounting numbers reported to make economic decisions 
(Power, 2001; Tollington, 2001). However, it has become evident that the accounting 
profession in some countries such as is heading towards measuring and reporting assets in 
reference to the market value (Lashinsky, 1999) as shown by their recently published 
accounting standards (ASCPA, 1999, pp. 6677-6782).  
 
The technology has enabled businesses to change their approach in reporting information to 
meet market needs of users (Jenkins, 1998, p. 1; Swinson, 1998,:p.4; ICA E&W, 1998, pp. 2-
3). Therefore, authors predict that the annual report of the future would recognise forward-
looking information such as IC (Roos et al, 1997, p. 21; Benjamin 1998, pp. 13-15).  
However, the profession is actively debating the issue of how to measure, manage, and report 
IC. Several authors agree that it is yet to gather a critical mass to achieve a significant change 
in the accounting profession (Benjamin, 1998, pp. 26-27; Brennan, 2001; Cook, 1998, p. 29; 
Fay, 1998, p. 28; Lipworth, 1998, p. 26). It is unlikely to see any major changes in the 
accounting standards followed by accountants mandated by the accounting profession to 
recognise IC in financial statements in the near future (Brennan, 2001). Several techniques 
have been developed to overcome the deficiency in ICR. 
 
The limitations imposed by the traditional accounting system in ICR, the theories which have 
little relationship to actual economic conditions, and the decided reluctance of the accounting 
profession to recognise IC in financial statements have encouraged firms to report IC in an 
ad-hoc fashion. These factors indicate that IC reporting will perpetuate for some time in an 
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unregulated reporting environment allowing firms to manipulate the economic, social, and 
political arrangement through unregulated ICR. 
 
Definitions of IC and ICR 
Edvinsson and Sullivan (1996) and Petrash (1996) outline intellectual assets as synonymous 
to IC. Many of them take a strategic view but they vary in their meanings from each other 
(Edvinsson & Sullivan, 1996; Brooking, 1997; Edvinsson, 1997; Edvinsson & Malone, 1998; 
Stewart, 1997, p. X; Klein, 1998, p. 1; Nasseri, 1998; Saint-Onge, 1998; Ulrich, 1998; CMA, 
1998, p. 3; ASCPA & CMA, 1999, p. 4; Knight, 1999).  The Society of Management 
Accountants of Canada (SMAC), on the other hand, offers an accounting based definition 
(IFAC, 1998, p. 12). However, the SMAC definition conflicts with the assets definition of the 
International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) and the Australian conceptual 
framework since SMAC defines assets using the criterion of owning the asset and others 
define using the criterion of controlling the asset (CPA Australia, 2000, pp. 49-69; IAS38, 
1998).  The diversity of definitions shows there is difficulty arriving at uniformity of 
definitions (ASCPA & CMA, 1999, p. 53) and a generally accepted theory of IC (Canibano, 
Garcia-Ayuso, Sanchez & Olea, 1999; Petty & Guthrie, 2000; van der Meer-Kooistra & 
Zijlstra, 2001).  
 
ICR has not been defined in the literature. However, the Australian accounting handbook 
defines general purpose financial reporting as ‘a financial report intended to meet the 
information needs common to users who are unable to command the preparation of reports 
tailored so as to satisfy, specifically, all of their information needs’ (ASCPA, 1999, p. 0005). 
Using the definition of general purpose financial reporting as a basis, this thesis defined ICR 
as ‘a report intended to meet the information needs common to users who are unable to 
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command the preparation of reports about IC tailored so as to satisfy, specifically, all of their 
information needs’ (Abeysekera & Guthrie, 2002). In doing so, the benefits should justify the 
cost incurred in reporting them.  The availability of several definitions and a lack of an 
uniformed definition of IC and IC reporting, enable firms to define them in an ad-hoc fashion 
for reporting purposes. The ad-hoc definitions can become the basis for justification of 
unregulated ICR which firms can manipulate to orchestrate their political, social, and 
economic arrangements. 
 
Techniques for reporting ICR 
Several techniques have been proposed to measure ICR as ratios and values (Montague 
Institute Review, 1998). The techniques could be classified into two broader categories, those 
that measure and report them at firm (macro) level for inter-firm comparisons and others that 
measure and report within firm level (micro) for inter-divisional comparisons (Abeysekera & 
Guthrie, 2002). 
 
Six broad indicators are used for measuring and reporting IC between firms: (i) the market to 
net book value; (ii) Tobin’s q ratio; (iii) calculated intangible value; (iv) direct IC; (v) Baruch 
Lev’s knowledge capital valuation; and (vi) Paul Strassmann’s knowledge capital valuation. 
Market to net book value (Roos, Dragonetti, & Edvinsson 1997, p. 2; Sveiby, 1997, pp. 3-18; 
Knight, 1999; Brennan, 2001) is the most popular and widely known indicator (Knight, 
1999). 
 
There are three ways to construct indicators to report IC within firms (Roos & Roos, 1997). 
These are, indicators as drivers of the vision, indicators to represent intellectual categories 
and indicators to represent inter-capital flows. The IC index is an indicator developed as a 
 15 
driver of the vision of a firm (Roos & Roos, 1997). The Intangible Assets Monitor
TM
 is a 
model developed to report IC as an indicator in relation to growth and renewal, efficiency, 
and stability of a firm (Sveiby, 1997, pp. 163-184). The Intellectual Accounting Scorecard is 
another model that integrates ICR into mainstream traditional accounting reporting 
(Abeysekera, 2002b). The return on knowledge assets on IC items is another reporting 
approach (Dekker & de Hoog, 2000) constructed to report indicators to represent inter-capital 
flows.  
As outlined in this section, IC performance can be measured and reported in six different 
ways for inter-firm comparison, enabling firms to adopt the reporting measure that fits best in 
their favour. The IC performance within the firm can also be reported in three broad methods, 
offering the firm a wider choice to select an appropriate indicator. The wide choice of ICR 
indicators to report performance both within and between firms enables firms to manipulate 
their political, social, and economic arrangements in an unregulated environment. 
 
ICR via theoretical classifications 
The theoretical classification of IC is simple and several, but Canibano et al. (1999) argue 
that they are not exhaustive. The analysis of IC available in the literature can be classified 
into five major frameworks: (i) Structures holding intellectual assets (Sveiby, 1997, pp. 93, 
11-12, 165). This framework focuses on intellectual assets; (ii) Capital holding intellectual 
items (Edvinsson, 1997; Edvinsson & Malone, 1998; Roos et al., 1997; Edvinsson & 
Sullivan, 1996), which has been modified by others (Stewart, 1997, pp. 229-246; Roos & 
Roos, 1997). It discusses ICR in relation to intellectual assets; (iii) Assets representing IC 
(Brooking, 1996, pp. 13-15, 129; 1999, pp. 153-155) but it focuses on intellectual assets; (iv) 
Strategic root and measurement root (Roos et al., 1997, p. 15) and it focus on the role of IC; 
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(v) A combination of assets and capital representing IC (SMAC, 1998, p. 14; IFAC, 1998, p. 
7). This framework is an extension of the assets representing IC. The organisational 
(structural) capital represents intellectual property and infrastructure assets.  
 
As outlined in this section, five major theoretical frameworks are discussed in the literature 
offering a choice of frameworks to report IC. 
 
3. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The inconsistent measurement rules to recognise accounting elements and the decided 
reluctance of the accounting profession to recognise IC in financial statements, and non-
uniformity of treatment of accounting elements between countries, has enabled firms to 
report IC in an unregulated environment. Accounting theorists proposing theories that have 
little relationship to economic conditions also has confounded the reporting aspects of IC.  
The literature offers several strategic and one accounting-based definition on IC. There was 
also hardly any definition of ICR in the literature. The absence of a uniform definition of IC 
and ICR has widened the reporting definitions and thereby increased ICR choices of firms. A 
literature review also identified four methods of ICR. First, reporting as ratios, at both inter-
firm and intra-firm level. Second, reporting as indicators to represent the vision of the firm, 
IC categories, and return on IC items. Third, reporting via IC statements. Fourth, reporting 
via IC framework. These choices offer firms the ability to select the best way to report IC in 
their favour. These choices of non-uniform ICR enable firms to use IC as a commodity to 
mediate their political, economic, and social arrangements. Although regulating ICR may not 
eliminate firms using IC as a commodity, unregulated reporting can enable firms to 
manipulate ICR to reduce tension between those firms and political, economic, and social 
structures, in a boundary-less environment.  
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Figure 1 
ICR in a PEA context 
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